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KENTuCKY LAW JOuRNAL
CRIMINAL LAW-PRESUMPTION OF MALICE FROM PROOF
OF THE HOMICIDE
The rule that malice will be presumed once the accused has
been proven to have committed the homicide is of uncertain origin,
but it can be traced back at least as far as the seventeenth century,
when Sir Matthew Hale wrote, "When one voluntarily kills
another without any provocation, it is murder, for the law pre-
sumes it to be malicious, and that he is hostis humani generis . . .'"
This principle is adhered to in England in Legg's Case,2 reported
in the early part of the eighteenth century, and it is elaborated
somewhat in Sir Michael Foster's work, where it is said:
"In every charge of murder, the fact of killing being first
proved, all the circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirm-
ity are to be satisfactorily proved by the prisoner, unless they
arise out of the evidence produced against him; for the law
presumeth the fact to have been founded in malice, until the
contrary appeareth. And very right it is, that the law should
so presume. The defendant in this instance standeth upon
just the same foot that every other defendant doth: the mat-
ters tending to justify, excuse, or alleviate, must appear In
evidence before he can avail himself of them."3
The rule is also recognized by Blackstone,' and is stated by
Lord Tindal as being the law in a case decided in the first half
of the nineteenth century.'
Thus the rule would appear to have been established as a
part of the English law of homicide. However, in 1935, in a case
in which it had been proved that the prisoner had shot his wife,
the court, tracing the rule back to Foster, and saying that no
previous authority existed for it, repudiates it on the ground that
it is contrary to the principles of English common law. The
court's rationalization of its position is as follows: "Throughout
the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always
to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the
prisoner's guilt. . . . If, at the end of and on the whole of the
case, there is reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by
either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner
killed the deceased with a malicious intention, the prosecution
has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an ac-
quittal."7
The earlier English view having been accepted as part of
the English common law, it was recognized in this country, and
'HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1778) 455.
2Kelyng 27, 84 Eng. Rep. 1066 (1708).
'FOSTER, CROWN LAW (2d ed. 1791) 255.4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (11th ed. 1790) 201.
Rex v. Greenacre and Gale, 8 Car. and P. 35, 173 Eng. Rep.
388 (1837).
6Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions (1935)
A. C. 462.
Ibid., 481.
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it has been applied quite frequently in homicide cases." In at
least two states, Idaho' and California," the presumption has been
made a part of the criminal law by statute; and it appears that
no court in this country has directly repudiated it as was done in
the Woolmington case.' The question therefore arises as to
whether or not the rule works such an injustice on one accused
of murder that the courts of this country should follow the ex-
ample set by the English court. The answer to the question
undoubtedly can best be found by seeing the effect of the pre-
sumption as it is used by the courts.
It might be well to begin by pointing out that in none of the
cases is the presumption sufficient for a conviction of murder in
the first degree." This is to be expected in consideration of the
usual statutory requirement that there must be premeditation
for first degree murder except in a few cases specified by the
statute." Even so, a conviction of second degree murder is of
sufficient gravity to warrant serious consideration of the possible
injustice of the presumption.
Although the courts of California and Virginia still do lip
service to the rule, the cases reveal that in actuality their position
is quite close to, if not identical with, that of the English court at
the present time. In California the presumption is statutory, and
although that state originally required the defendant to overcome
the presumption by a preponderance of evidence," a later case
repudiated that position and said: "The well settled rule that a
defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every
material part of the case, no matter whether it is as to the act
of killing, or the reason for or manner of its commission."' Per-
"Wagner v. State, 37 S. W. 2d 86 (Ark., 1931); State v. Sim-
borski, 120 Conn. 724, 182 Atl. 221 (1936); State v. Di Battista, 110
Conn. 549, 148 Atl. 664 (1930); Commonwealth v. Bedrosian, 247
Mass. 573, 142 N. E. 778 (1924); Brown v. State, 62 N. J. L. 66, 42
Atl. 811 (1899); Commonwealth v. Troup, 302 Pa. 246, 153 Atl. 337
(1931). See, State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220 (1824); Mercer v. Com-
monwealth, 150 Va. 588, 142 S. E. 369 (1928); Brown v. Common-
wealth, 138 Va. 807, 122 S. E. 421 (1924).
'IDAHO CODE (1932) Sec. 19-2012.
:,, CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE (Deering, 1937) Sec. 1105.
"Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions (1935)
A. C. 462.
"Wagner v. State, 37 S. W. 2d 86 (Ark., 1931); Commonwealth
v. Bedrosian, 247 Mass. 573, 142 N. E. 778 (1924); Brown v. State,
62 N. J. L. 66, 119 Atl. 324 (1899); Commonwealth v. Troup, 302 Pa.
246, 153 Atl. 337 (1931).
"'CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE (Deering, 1937) Sec. 189; GENERAL
STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT (Revision of 1930) Sec. 6043; COMPILED
LAWS OF MICHIGAN (1929) Sec. 16708; NEW YoRx PENAL LAW
(Thompson, 1939) Sec. 1044.
"People v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 387 (1882).
'People v. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 22 Pac. 127, 129 (1889).
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haps, therefore, in California as in England, if the prosecution
proved that the defendant had killed a person, and proved nothing
else, there could be no conviction of murder since there would
certainly be a reasonable doubt as to the malice.
It also appears that the Virginia court, although it recognizes
the rule, refuses to apply it in such a way as to give it any force.
In the case of Roark v. Commonwealth,'6 the defendant struck the
deceased such a blow as would not ordinarily have caused death,
but the deceased, an old man in poor health, fell to the ground
and struck his head, causing his death. The court, although it
said that as a general rule malice is presumed from the killing,
stated that the rule could not be applied in this case since death
was not the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
act.
In the jurisdictions in which the rule is applied rtrictly, as it
was formerly in England, the likelihood of its working a hardship
on the defendant seems small indeed. It must be recognized that
in almost every case in which the rule could be applied, the death
was caused by the use of a deadly weapon, and thus the deadly
weapon doctrine could properly be applied. In only one case does
it seem that the application of the rule might have been unjust
to the defendant.' In that case according to the defendant's testi-
mony, the defendant's wife was trying to get a gun away from
him, and in the struggle the gun went off, killing her. In this
case, it seems possible to say that at the time of the accident the
gun was not being used by the defendant as a deadly weapon,
and that there should have been no presumption of malice. If
this interpretation be correct, then in this case at least, the use
of the presumption brought about an improper result.
The effect and significance of the rule at the present time
may be summed up as follows: In England the rule clearly has
been repudiated, and so long as there is a reasonable doubt as to
the malice there can be no conviction of murder. In a few states
in this country the rule, although recited by the courts, is, for
all practical purposes, not applied by them. In the states in which
the rule is effectively applied it seems that it would rarely work
an injustice, since it is seldom applicable where the deadly weapon
doctrine is not applicable. However, it would be desirable to do
away with the presumption because of the possibility of improper
results in a few cases such as the Mangino case," and because, as
is pointed out in the Woolmington case," it is contrary to the rule
of criminal law that the prosecution must prove the defendant's
guilt. FRANK SELBY HURST
1 182 Va. 244, 28 S. E. 2d 693 (1944).
"State v. Mangino, 156 Atl. 430 (New Jersey, 1931).
'" Ibid.
"Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions (1935)
A. C. 462.'
